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## CUBA AND CONGRESS.

BY ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM INDIANA.

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To appreciate the moderation and restraint of the Cuban legislation of Congress, it is necessary to consider the previously defined national policy of the United States respecting Cuba. To this national policy American statesmen of all political parties have given continuous expression. Jefferson led off, in 1808, by deprecating the acquisition of Cuba by any other power than Spain. In 1809, he was discussing whether Napoleon would "consent to our receiving Cuba into our nation." The thought steadily grew with him until, in 1823, he announced the settled conviction of the country which every American statesman has followed. He said:

"I have ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of states. The control which, with Florida Point, this island would give us over the Gulf of Mexico, and the countries and isthmus bordering on it, would fill up the measure of our political well-being. Her addition to our confederacy is exactly what is wanting to advance our power as a nation to the point of its utmost interest."

Monroe suggested the ownership of Cuba as a military necessity. The acquisition of Cuba was the chief aim of Pierce's foreign policy. The main effort of Polk's administration was to purchase this island. The movement was confined to no one political party. John Quincy Adams, in a formal letter, as Secretary of State, said, in 1823, of Cuba:

"Its commanding position with reference to the Gulf of Mexico and the West India seas, the character of its population, its situation midway between our southern coast and the island of St. Domingo, its safe and capacious harbor of Havana, fronting a long line of our shores destitute of the same advantage, the nature of its products and of its wants, furnishing the supplies and needing the returns of a commerce immensely profitable and mutually beneficial—give it an importance in the sum of our national interests with which that of no other foreign territory can be compared and little inferior to that

which binds the different members of this Union together. Such, indeed, are, between the interests of that island and of this country, the geographical, commercial, moral and political relations formed by nature, gathering in the process of time, and even now (1823) verging to maturity, that, looking forward to the probable course of events, for the short period of half a century, it is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our federal Republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself."

Mr. Adams then showed that, at that particular time, we were not prepared for this event, but added:

"If an apple, severed by the tempest from its native tree, cannot but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural connection with Spain and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only towards the North American Union, which by the same law of nature cannot cast her from its bosom."

Henry Clay, as Secretary of State, in 1825, nervously anxious as he then was, for political reasons, to state his views mildly, nevertheless said in a formal letter, as Secretary of State:

"If the war should continue between Spain and the new republics, and those islands (Cuba and Porto Rico) should become the object and theatre of it, their fortunes have such a connection with the prosperity of the United States that they could not be indifferent spectators; and the possible contingencies of such a protracted war might bring upon the government of the United States duties and obligations the performance of which, however painful it should be, they might not be at liberty to decline."

Even Mr. Van Buren, that fox of American statesmanship, who never said anything that was not susceptible of different meanings, said, as Secretary of State, in 1829:

"The government of the United States has always looked with the deepest interest upon the fate of those islands, but particularly upon Cuba. Its geographical position, which places it almost in sight of our southern shores, and, as it were, gives it command of the Gulf of Mexico and the West India seas, its safe and capacious harbors, its rich productions, the exchange of which for our surplus agricultural products and manufactures constitutes one of the most extensive and valuable branches of our foreign trade, render it of the utmost importance to the United States that no change should take place in its condition which might injuriously affect our political and commercial standing in that quarter."

In 1848, Buchanan, in a formal letter, as Secretary of State, said:

"If Cuba were annexed to the United States we would not only be relieved from the apprehensions which we can never cease to feel for our own safety and the security of our commerce, whilst it shall remain in its present condition, but human foresight cannot anticipate the beneficial consequences which would result to every portion of our Union. This can never become a local question. With suitable fortification at the Tortugas, and in possession of the strongly fortified harbor of Havana as a naval station on the opposite coast of Cuba,

we could command the outlet of the Gulf of Mexico, between the peninsula of Florida and that island. This would afford ample security both to the foreign and coasting trade of the Western and Southern states, which seek a market for their surplus productions through the ports of the Gulf. Under the government of the United States, Cuba would become the richest and most fertile island of the same extent throughout the world."

In 1859, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate reported favorably a bill "to facilitate the acquisition of the Island of Cuba," in which report the Committee said:

"The ultimate acquisition of Cuba may be considered a fixed purpose of the United States—a purpose resulting from political and geographical necessities, which have been recognized by all parties and all administrations, and in regard to which the popular voice has been expressed with a unanimity unsurpassed on any question of national policy that has heretofore engaged the public mind. The purchase and annexation of Louisiana led, as a necessary corollary, to that of Florida, and both point with unerring certainty to the acquisition of Cuba."

And, further on, in considering the question of constitutional power, the Committee quoted the famous words of Thomas Jefferson:

"I am persuaded that no constitution was ever before so well calculated as ours for extensive empire and self-government."

The slavery question was at this juncture thrust into this national movement; but even that was not sufficient to make the minority of the Committee, headed by Mr. Seward, protest against the acquisition of Cuba. That was the most remarkable circumstance in this whole discussion; for, if anything could have induced Mr. Seward and the abolitionists to attack the proposition, its advocacy by the slave power would have done it. But, in expressing the views of the minority of the Committee, Mr. Seward merely reported a short bill as a substitute for the majority bill, directing the President:

"To communicate to the Senate the condition of the relations which shall then (next session) be subsisting between the United States and Spain, and of any negotiations that may then be pending for the cession of Cuba to the United States, together with such statements of the conditions of the treasury, and also of the effective condition of the army and navy of the United States, as may enable Congress to judge whether at that time it will be necessary to adopt any extraordinary measures to maintain the rights and promote the interests of the United States, connected with or growing out of their relations to Spain."

In the same year, Judah P. Benjamin demonstrated that the United States must possess Cuba as a measure of safety. He said:

"Her harbors not only furnish points of rendezvous for hostile fleets, but secure harbors of refuge in which they could refit and repair, and prepare themselves for fresh attacks on our unprotected coasts. It was those harbors that afforded refuge for the British fleet after its descent on New Orleans; and in them did the French fleet refit after its bombardment of the castle of San Juan d'Ulloa. In the event of a rupture with Great Britain, this would be, in her possession, a tremendous point of vantage for attack. It is for these reasons that the instincts of the American people have already taught them that we shall ever be insecure against hostile attack until this important geographical and military position is placed under our protection and control."

Benjamin was a pro-slavery man, but Edward Everett was an anti-slavery man; and yet, as Secretary of State, in a formal letter in his official capacity, Everett said:

"Cuba lies at our doors. It commands the approaches to the Gulf of Mexico, which washes the shores of five of our states. It bars the entrance to that great river which drains all of the North American continent. Geographically and commercially, Cuba would in our hands be an extremely valuable possession. Under certain contingencies it might be almost essential to our safety."

But he says that, for "domestic reasons (slavery)," the acquisition of Cuba "at the present time" (1852) was impracticable.

Stephen A. Douglas, Democrat, was earnestly for annexation in 1851; and Clayton, Whig, spoke of the future annexation of Cuba as a certainty. William L. Marcy believed that if he could secure the acquisition of Cuba while Secretary of State, that single stroke would make him President. And the effort of the life of the "great Secretary" was directed to this end.

The tremendous internal questions following the Civil War diverted the attention of the American people, for almost a generation, from their national policy of expansion; and, for thirty years, there was a dearth of expression upon the subject. But the instinctive purpose of the people asserted itself as soon as conditions within the present boundaries of the Republic had become normal. Accordingly, during the last ten years, expressions similar to the above, and directed to expansion generally, have begun to come again from men of weight and judgment, growing in volume and vigor up to the present hour. With these the public is so familiar that space cannot be spared to quote them.

The fact back of these expressions and giving them meaning and vitality is, that they were the voice of the American people. This whole historic movement has been the expression of the purpose of the people, and not the plan of politicians. As

early as 1739, the American colonists petitioned England to let them capture Cuba, which they called in their petition, "that key to all America." In 1762, when the English captured Havana, they did it with the aid of American troops; and the event caused great rejoicing throughout the American colonies, the greatest public demonstration of all being held by the people of Boston. During our revolutionary war, our ships and fleets found harbor and refuge in Cuba. From the beginning, it has been with the greatest difficulty that our Presidents have held our impatient people in leash. Taylor and Fillmore issued proclamations forbidding American expeditions against Cuba. DeBow in his *Commercial Review*, at the period of its greatest influence, declared that "public opinion is uniform and unanimous that the safety and security of the United States demand the annexation of Cuba." And yet DeBow himself was hostile to the proposition. He was merely recording a fact as an editorial observer. Democratic newspapers in the South and Whig newspapers in the North, agreeing on nothing else, agreed upon this. The Whig *New York Times*, in an editorial in 1852, criticised Fillmore for not acquiring Cuba, and the *New York Tribune* quoted the *Times* editorial on November 25th, 1852. The State of Kentucky even went so far as to present to the Senate a formal petition praying for the acquisition of Cuba.

That the consummation of this national policy of the American people was inevitable, has been the uniform opinion of political thinkers of foreign countries—even of Spain itself. Speaking of 1854, Rhodes, in his "History of the United States," says: "The most sensible men of Spain were convinced that Cuba must sooner or later belong to the United States." In 1887, Froude, that keenest observer of all English historians, called America "the residuary legatee of all the West Indies."

Such was the current of American opinion and policy, and such was the view of the world, down to the moment when the Teller resolution was attached to the declaration of Congress demanding that Spain withdraw from Cuba. That resolution is as follows:

"That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people."

This resolution was reported to the Senate by the committee immediately before a vote was taken on the declaration to which it was attached, and was adopted as a part thereof without discussion.

If it means that the United States should utterly withdraw from Cuba, leaving that people, without aid, guidance or restraint, to work their ruin and our injury, this resolution is destructive of the unanimous conclusion of American statesmanship and public opinion from before the foundation of our government. It cannot mean such withdrawal, therefore, since it is a rule of interpretation, familiar to courts, that no law must be construed as repealing all former laws on the same subject if it admits of a meaning in harmony with them. And it is not within rational belief that Congress intended such a sudden reversal of the unbroken line of expressions of American purpose on this subject.

If the Teller resolution means the unconditional abandonment of the Cuban people by the United States, without having taken measures to secure a stable government, it was intended to prevent Cuban liberty and retard Cuban progress; for that such would be the result of such entire American desertion of Cuba I shall presently demonstrate. Such a meaning, therefore, cannot be attributed to Congress, whose purpose in going to war with Spain was to aid and not to injure the Cuban people.

If this resolution means that we were to cast Cuba adrift, a derelict on our very coasts, it was intended to impair the interests, paralyze the Cuban commerce and imperil the safety of the United States; for that such would be the result is known of all men. But a purpose so unpatriotic we dare not attribute to Congress, which, while inspired by an earnest friendship for every other people, owes its first and highest duty to the American people.

But if such be the meaning of this resolution, let us frankly admit that it was a mistake; and between the consummation of such a mistake with its ruinous consequences, on the one hand, and the frank and brave correction of it by the establishment and protection of liberty, order, rights and law, on the other hand, there is no choice. In individual morals and in national statesmanship the latter is the only course possible.

But does not a study of the whole subject give this resolution

a different meaning? Must it not be read in the light of our entire history, of which it is a part? Must it not be interpreted by the geographical, industrial, social and human conditions inherent in the situation? Such construction is natural, customary, essential. No act of American statesmanship stands alone. All that is enduring is the result of growth and outgrowth. Submitted to these usual and ordinary principles of interpretation, construed by these admitted standards of wisdom and justice, the Teller resolution does not deny, but demands, that the United States shall take measures to insure, on the one hand, the realities and not the mockery of liberty to the Cuban people and to insure, on the other hand, the welfare of the American people. Interpreted by these principles and measured by these standards, this resolution requires that the United States shall see to it that a stable Cuban government is established and maintained, and that the island is protected from all foreign interference or attack. Is any other interpretation sane? Would not any court, construing the expression of the purpose of an individual, consider the whole case of which that expression is a part? And can this result in injury to Cuba? Who so concerned as the United States that Cuba shall have law, order, prosperity and peace within and be secure from molestation from without? Who so interested as Cuba in the safety of the United States, upon whose markets, investments and active friendship Cuba's welfare depends? The resolution cannot be interpreted in hostility to the American people who made possible a Cuban government of any kind. And to construe it as requiring us to abandon the Cuban people to their fate is to do them irreparable wrong. Such construction would annul the resolution's very letter and defeat its expressed purpose. Considered even as an isolated statement, such construction is impossible; impossible, considered as a part of the unbroken current of American statesmanship; impossible, considered as a rule of procedure by which Congress was to solve the practical problem confronting it.

What was that problem? The facts define it.

Cuba was not able to expel Spain. Not all the Cuban people wanted Spain expelled. The United States ejected Spanish government from that island. In doing this, the United States expended many scores of millions of dollars. Our soldiers gladly gave their lives. And when the Spanish flag was hauled down



and the American flag had taken its place, the Administration found property destroyed, roads few and poor, school-houses scanty and abandoned. It found a postal service hardly superior to that of Spain a hundred years ago. It found an appalling illiteracy. It found cities without sanitation. It found poverty, starvation, demoralization and all but anarchy. And yet these conditions were very little inferior to those which existed before the insurrection of the Cubans against Spanish authority. No more instructive study can be found than that of the sanitary situation reported in the American census of the island for 1899.

A separate article might be devoted to a statement of the vital statistics of Cuba. One or two facts may serve as a suggestive searchlight in passing. The population of the island is 1,572,797. Of this population, 1,108,709 are single, 246,357 are married, and 131,732 are living together by mutual consent. Of this population, 1,067,354 are whites and 505,443 are colored. Of the whites, almost all are of Spanish descent. Of these more than one million whites, fifty per cent. can neither read nor write; and of the more than half a million colored, more than seventy per cent. can neither read nor write. This is the statement of our census, taken by Cuban collectors. A gentleman of unquestioned reliability, and of thorough personal familiarity with the Cuban people, informs me that at least seventy per cent. of the whites and more than ninety per cent. of the colored population can neither read nor write. And yet, under our military administration order has been restored and maintained, property and life protected, and sanitary revolution has been effected in Havana, Santiago and the other considerable cities of the island. An excellent postal service has been established, and is now in operation in every province. Under the Spanish régime, at its best estate, scarcely 10,000 children were in school. At the time we took possession, there were less than 4,000 children in school. The education was slothful, fragmentary, unscientific. To-day, there are more than 150,000 Cuban children in school, and education is systematized and conducted on approved and modern principles.

And these items are only the landmarks of what has really been accomplished. All this, too, has been done by American authority in two years' time. It is a record of administrative capacity to which history shows no parallel. Of the remarkable

achievements of the present Administration, not one is more brilliant than its conduct of affairs in the island of Cuba.

How best to preserve and continue this progress of Cuba; how, at the same time, to secure the safety and protect the interests of the United States; how to interpret the historic purpose of the American people, who had sacrificed so much treasure and blood for the Cuban people; and how to act so that the Teller resolution would not defeat itself, and so that a steady government might exist in Cuba, were the profound, complex and most delicate questions which Congress was called upon to answer, and which the Cuban Committee of the United States Senate, with Orville H. Platt, of Connecticut, at its head, answered so well in the Cuban Amendment to the Army Bill.

Let us consider this amendment.

That no foreign power shall establish any but trade relations with Cuba is necessary to both Cuba and the United States. It is intolerable that any foreign power shall obtain jurisdiction over an inch of Cuban soil. It is intolerable even to think of the government of Cuba giving to Germany or England or France or any other great power, a naval station. And yet, without restriction, the Cuban government could give any foreign power rights amounting to that, and keep within the Monroe Doctrine. Think of the consequences! From Tortugas to Havana is only ninety miles; from Cuba to Yucatan is little more than one hundred miles. A foreign squadron, with naval rendezvous in Havana harbor and a small patrol along the difficult Yucatan passage, could blockade the Gulf of Mexico, the Isthmian canal, the Mississippi River, and absolutely cut off our immense foreign commerce from and to our Gulf and Mississippi River ports, and our immeasurably greater coastwise trade, much more completely than the same naval strength could blockade the harbor of New York. Accordingly, the Cuban Amendment to the Army Bill provides:

"That the government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign Power or Powers which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorize or permit any foreign Power or Powers to obtain by colonization or for military or naval purposes, or otherwise, lodgment in or control over any portion of said island."

But it is also necessary that the United States shall actually *possess* such naval stations along the Cuban coasts as

may be necessary to our national defence and to the defence of Cuba. The Cuban people, numbering only a million and a half, unassisted by us, could not properly fortify or equip their harbors. Certainly they could not build a fleet necessary to the island's protection; and if they could, such a fleet, in certain contingencies apparent to all men, might be a menace to the American government. But with the United States in possession of the necessary naval stations, the independence of the island and its people from every foreign Power and every combination of foreign Powers is assured, and the American Republic secured from attack in the Gulf, at the mouth of the Mississippi. Accordingly the Cuban Amendment to the Army Bill provides:

"That to enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defense, the Government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the United States."

Even this is not broad enough for the protection of the Cuban people and of American interests and safety. A familiar method by which a Power secures practical control of a desirable point inhabited by a weak people, is to seize that people's ports in order to collect the revenues for payment of debt. The first necessity of a new government is money. Its earliest condition is financial obligation. Without restriction and guidance by a friendly and experienced government whose interests are the interests of the Cuban people, it was inevitable that the new and experimental government of the island would contract debts beyond the ability of the Cuban people to pay. This has been the experience of nearly all new governments. If such a debt were contracted in England or Germany or France, it was inevitable that upon default of payment either of those Powers would seize the revenues of the island to indemnify their citizens against loss. And the United States could not prevent this, unless the United States would guarantee such debt, or go to war with the creditor Power to prevent its just collection. Every one of these contingencies is inconsistent with American safety and interests, and even more inconsistent with the interests, liberty and independence of the Cuban people. Therefore the Cuban Amendment to the Army Bill provides:

"That said government (Cuba) shall not assume or contract any public debt to pay the interest upon which, and to make reasonable

sinking-fund provision for the ultimate discharge of which, the ordinary revenues of the island, after defraying the current expenses of government, shall be inadequate."

It will be helpful to recall that the debt Spain contracted for Cuba was \$400,000,000; and this debt the Cuban Amendment prevents Cuba from ever paying or being compelled to pay. The bonds issued by the revolutionary government in the insurrection preceding the last, and still held somewhere by some one, are supposed to reach into the hundreds of millions. The amount of bonds issued by the last insurrectionary government, held by persons in Cuba and the United States, is unknown; but I have heard it estimated at from \$100,000 to \$300,000,000. No accurate information can be had concerning the quantity of these bonds, or of the bonds of the former insurrectionary government. What part, if any, they play at present can only be surmised. It is doubtful if they affect the question; but they are useful as indicating the financial certainties of an unrestrained Cuban government.

Even with all the above, the welfare of the Cuban people was still open to attack from another enemy and at their weakest point. That point was within, and that enemy themselves. The right of the United States to intervene for the maintenance of the realities of Cuban freedom is the measure of all measures most in the interests of the Cuban people. Would it have been wise and just to neglect this most important and immediate obligation of all? If it is our business to see that the Cubans are not destroyed by any foreign Power, is it not our duty to see that they are not destroyed by themselves? It was a far-seeing benevolence which inspired Congress to provide that we may preserve the Cuban government from the hands of warring factions, and protect the individual liberty, the property and the rights of Cuban citizens. Congress actually bestowed upon Cuba the same guaranty of social order and governmental stability, which our Constitution guarantees to every one of the States of the Union. This great provision of the Cuban Amendment is as follows:

**"That the Government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the Government of Cuba."**

The sanitation of Cuba was the pressing problem which confronted the Administration upon our occupation of the island, and it is the immediate question which will confront the island's new government. In this vital business even the best-equipped Cubans are unschooled. And yet, upon proper sanitation depends the security of the Cuban people from pestilence. Upon it depends the safety of our own people from yellow-fever. New Orleans, Mobile, Tampa, all our Southern ports, have time and again been infected, and the disease has spread northward even to the Ohio. It is a subject which admitted and admits of no trifling. It is a business to be dealt with practically and on the instant. To enthrone a plague in a permanent home at the very gates of the Republic would have been an act which a volume of resolutions, no matter how interpreted, never could have excused. And Congress never wrought more wisely than when it provided in the Cuban Amendment:

"That the Government of Cuba will execute, and as far as necessary extend, the plans already devised, or other plans to be mutually agreed upon, for the sanitation of the cities of the island, to the end that a recurrence of epidemic and infectious diseases may be prevented, thereby assuring protection to the people and commerce of Cuba, as well as to the commerce of the Southern ports of the United States and the people residing therein."

That the sinister situations, which the Cuban Amendment are designed to prevent, would have been the results of a Cuban government unaided by the United States, is not an open question. Were no examples at hand, the character and history of the Cuban population itself proves this. But examples are at hand, and the men to whom the American people have intrusted their interests, and those of the Cuban people also, had to consider them.

These examples are the Central and South American Republics. Review them, taking the most advantageously situated first.

The Argentine Republic has the best climate, the most fertile soil and the richest resources of any portion of South America, and, with perhaps two exceptions, of the entire surface of the earth. It has a larger percentage of the solid, self-governing people of Europe than any other South American state. But its history bristles with revolt. There have been two revolutions within the last ten years. The killing and wounding of two or

three thousand people in a political riot has occurred more than once. Schemes of financial idealists have been put into reckless practice. And yet the paper constitution of this republic is admirable, its schools numerous and its system of education, in theory, excellent.

To the north of the Argentine Republic lies Brazil. It became a republic in 1890 by bloodless revolution. In one year another revolution placed Peixoto in the President's chair; and, in less than two years more, another revolution, with the army supporting one side and the navy the other, continued until Admiral Benham, in command of the warships of the United States, threatened to fire on the insurgent navy in the harbor of Rio de Janeiro, thus ending the revolt. To the north of Brazil is Venezuela. From 1821, when independence was established, until 1870, Venezuela was in a state of almost continuous convulsion. And although peace has been more assured since that time, conditions have been anything but settled.

Of Colombia, from which Venezuela seceded after Bolivar had wrested independence from Spain, Hamblen Sears declares: "Its history to the present day has been one of the sudden rise of one or another of the popular leaders and his sudden fall." This, too, is largely true of Costa Rica, although the government of that state has been and is more stable than that of most Spanish-American republics.

Guatemala has been the red field of revolution and the hot bed of impracticable dreams. Of Honduras, Mr. Sears declares that, "like the other Central American republics, Honduras has been full of bloodshed and internal war." And he says that "Nicaragua, since 1860, has been most of the time in a state of war, interrupted with a change of presidents and numerous pronunciamientos." The history of Peru is the narrative of the rise and fall of dictators. Those who think that the ability of the Cuban people to frame a paper constitution with rapidity is an evidence of capacity for self-government, should remember that Peru surpasses Cuba as a rapid constitution-maker, having produced three separate constitutions in little more than ten years—one in 1828, one in 1833, and still another in 1839. And Mr. Sears despairingly writes: "The Salvadorian constitution has been so often changed that it is impossible to follow it." Until recent years, Chile has been in a state of recurrent revolution and violence.

The condition of public order was illustrated by the attack upon the peaceful seamen of the American ship "Baltimore," still fresh in the memory of all. Not a single Spanish-American republic brightens this melancholy chronicle. Paraguay has been the scene of so much strife that its male population was at one time almost extinct. And Uruguay has been called the "Battle-field of the La Platta." All these countries show a languid progress toward settled conduct and self-restraint; but every forward step has been made at terrible cost—a cost which the aid and instruction of a friendly and experienced government might have saved to each, while accelerating that progress incalculably.

It must be repeated and again repeated that the paper constitutions of these countries have been fine examples of government by manuscript. This clarifying fact must not be forgotten by those who think that government by manuscript is equivalent to government by practice.

These political phenomena, common to all Spanish-American republics, whether in the tropic, semi-tropic or temperate zone, unvaried by climate or character of soil, and occurring in spite of excellent paper constitutions, are object-lessons which Congress dared not disregard. The character of the people of these republics is similar to that of the people of Cuba. Their racial origin is the same. Their history has been the same. Their tutelage under Spanish misrule has been the same. If there is any element of difference, that element is the greater proportion of blacks in Cuba. But history and contemporaneous fact do not justify the belief that this element, left to itself, increases the Cuban capacity for self-government, unaided, unguided and unrestrained.

Hayti, directly across from Cuba, is an instance. When under the rule of the French, all writers agree that, in spite of the drawback of slavery, Hayti was a prosperous colony. But from the time French power was overthrown its condition has been serious. A late writer says that "the atrocious administration of the government all through the Haytian history of this century has been unequalled in the world." On the contrary, British Guiana and British Honduras, with government administered by those who have a capacity for administration, have enjoyed a steadiness of order and a respect for law unequalled elsewhere in South or Central America; and New Mexico, with a

population racially similar to those of Spanish America, has, under our administration, given us no trouble.

In dealing with Cuba, Congress could not ignore all this. Congress was compelled to consider the character and inexperience of Cuba's population; the history of the attempts of similar populations to govern themselves; the present condition of such experimental governments on the one hand, and the situation of the same populations, guided and restrained by the protection of an administrative people, on the other hand. Congress had to consider, too, the facts of the last two years—the expulsion of Spain from Cuba by American arms; the occupation of the island by American authority, law and order; the feeding of starving Cuban thousands with American bread; the establishment of Cuban schools, posts and sanitation upon modern methods by American administrators; the American purification of the Cuban customs service; the impartial American administration of Cuban justice; the protection of Cuban life and property by an American and Americanized police; the beginning of the development of the richest agricultural, mineral and timber resources on the face of the globe, under the faith of American protection; in a word, the American foundation in Cuba of civilization and of that liberty regulated by law which is the end and purpose of all free government. Congress had to consider, too, the American people. The sacrifices of the American people in blood and treasure and administration deserved such consideration. The geographical position of Cuba demanded it. The historian of a century hence would have properly denounced any action on the part of the American Congress which, by any possibility, might result in delivering this gateway to the American Mediterranean, to any and all Isthmian canals, to the mouth of that great artery of American commerce, the Mississippi River, to our whole gulf seaboard of 3,551 miles, over into the hands of those who, by treaty or purchase or any circumstances of peace or war, might possibly become our national foes.

Thus it appears that our Cuban legislation deprives Cuba of nothing that can help her, but bestows every benefit and erects every safeguard necessary to her settled and orderly self-government. It insures the development of the island's resources and the highest happiness possible to its people. Against the enemies of Cuba, foreign and domestic, is drawn the sword of



the Great Republic; and under its protection the infant state may grow in peace and wax strong in a sure security. It is an inspiring scene with which the young century begins—the newest government of the world aided, guided and protected by the freest.

We are not depriving Cuba of liberty; we are helping her to liberty. Land owners are not to be robbed; they are to be protected. Cities are not to be sacked; they are to be defended. Equal rights are not to be violated; they are to be preserved and enforced. Free speech is not to be suppressed; it is to be fostered. Education is not to be destroyed; it is to be built up. But anarchy is to be kept down, foreign Powers kept at bay, and the elements that oppose Cuban progress held in check. All this is not the denial of liberty; it is the bestowal of liberty. For liberty cannot live without order and law.

The Cuban people and the American people are not and are not to be enemies or strangers. We are and are still more to be friends, "close friends," to use the President's felicitous phrase. We are not yet united into a single nation as the fathers hoped we should be; and such a union never may occur. But, while establishing Cuba's independent governmental identity, the United States has given her our permanent counsel, aid and comfort. Whether that relation shall develop into a still closer connection depends upon the Cuban people. It is a question which time alone can adequately answer. No wisdom equals the wisdom of events. And the Cuban legislation of Congress permits the wisdom of events to work out its results in its own time. Meanwhile, the relation established by that legislation is admirable, considered from the view-point of the present; and it may prove the permanent solution of this hitherto vexed and vexing problem. But whether this is the final development, or whether it is an epoch in an historical evolution, growing ever happier as it proceeds, the welfare of the Cuban people and the safety of the American people are secure.

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